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Technical means of monitoring are used to verify compliance to arms control treaties. Numerical
estimates are developed in order to quantify some aspects of (1) nuclear testing (signatures,
optical double pulse calibration, decoupling in cavities, and high-frequency components in
seismic signals), (2) optical reconnaissance (films versus CCDs, air turbulence, adaptive optics,
and digital image processing), (3) infrared (resolution and detection sensitivity), and (4) radar
(synthetic aperture and missile coefficient).

I.INTRODUCI'ION
Over the past several decades there has been remarkable
progress in some military technologies such as the in
creased accuracy of missiles with guidance using stellar
locations, Navstar Global Positioning Satellites (GPS),
and terrain mapping (TERCOM). At the same time, there
has been considerable progress in the technologies which
enhance the monitoring of military activities and systems
of "the other side." These improvements have been both in
quality, with better resolution and data management, and
in scope, with new methods ofmeasurement. The technical
means of monitoring military endeavors can be extremely
important for arms control for three fundamental reasons:
( 1) They can remove worst case analyses such as that
which caused the missile "gap" of 1960, (2) they can allow
the US Congress and the Executive branch to have confi
dence to accept possible arms control treaties,and (3) they
can deter leaders from becoming too "adventuresome."
The purpose of this paper is to consider the technical
aspects! of some of the means of verification; therefore, it
will not include discussions of such topics as the historical,
political, and legal aspects ofverification; the criteria of the
quality of verification ("adequate versus effective"); the
possible vulnerability to "breakouts" from arms control
treaties; the intemational means of verification by the In
temational Atomic Energy Agency or the proposed Inter
national Satellite Monitoring Agency; various cooperative
means of verification where each side helps the other side
with its ability to monitor; the specific terms of arms con
trol treaties; and so forth. As in the other papers 2 in this
series of science and society tests, the calculations on the
physics of verification will use only widely accepted nu
merical parameters, and the results are consistent with
those from more sophisticated calculations, or with experi
mental data. In particular, this paper will quantify the fol
lowing aspects3 of the technical means of verification:
(i) Nuclear testing: Detection capabilities implied by
the flux of x rays, gamma rays, and neutrons from explo
sions in space; calibration ofthe yield of an explosion in the
atmosphere from the timing ofthe optical double pulse; the
size of a cavity to decouple an underground nuclear explo
sion; and the measurement of the high-frequency compo
nents of seismic signals to detect decoupling in a cavity.
(ii) Optical reconnaissance: Comparison of the perfor
mance of film and charge-coupled devices; defocusing by
looking downwards through atmospheric turbulence; reso
lution with adaptive optics for observing satellites in orbit

from the earth; enhancement of images with digital image
processing techniques such as the Fourier tansform convo
lution and addition theroems.
(iii) Infrared monitoring: Resolution and detection sen
sitivity.
(iv) Radar monitoring: Synthetic aperture radar
(SAR) and measurement of the missile coefficient.
II. NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATIES
A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which
would ban all nuclear tests might slow the development of
new weapons systems, would improve the political climate
between the superpowers, and would make our weapons
policy more consistent with the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) of 1970 in which the nonnuclear-weapons
states have given up their rights to possess and test nuclear
weapons. The debate on nuclear test ban treaties has cen
tered on the verifiability of such agreements, as well as the
need to test to develop new warhead designs and to main
tain the reliability of the weapons stockpile. In this section
we would like to address the detection and identification of
nuclear weapons tests in space (Sec. II A), in the atmo
sphere (Sec. II B), and underground (Sec. II C).
A. Tests in space
The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 forbids
the testing of nuclear weapons in space, in the atmosphere,
and underwater. In order to monitor these treaties, it is
necessary to determine the necesary sensitivity to detect
nuclear weapons tests. What are the approximate magni
tudes of the neutron, x-ray, and prompt gamma-ray fluxes
from a l-kt weapon exploded in space at a distance of
20 000 km from the new Global Positioning Satellites
(GPS)? Assume4 that about 70% of the energy appears as
x rays and 0.3% as prompt gamma rays, and that the aver
age temperature of the initial fireball in space is about the
same as the core of the Sun, 20 X 106 K. (lkt = 10 12
cal = 4.2X 1O!2 J.)
Answer. The yield of a l-kt weapon is 4.2X 10 12 J, or
2.6X 1025 MeV. If one assumes that each fission event re
leases about 200 MeV along with one extra neutron that
escapes from the weapon, the total number ofneutrons that
escape from a l-kt warhead is
N(n) = (2.6X 1025 MeV) (I n/2oo MeV)

=

1.3 X 1~3 neutrons.

The neutron flux from a weapon of Y kt at a distance of R
km is
(Y X 1.3 X 1023 )1( 41T)(R X 105 cm)2
= lO 12 y IR 2 neutrons/cm 2 .

The flux at a distance of20 000 km from the GPS satellite is
10 1214 X 108 = 2500 neutrons/cm 2 /kt.
The flux ofenergy from the x rays at a distance of R km is
U = (0.7)( Y X2.6X 1025 MeV1(41T)(R X 105 cm)2
= 1.4x 10 14 y IR 2 (MeV Icm 2 )

•

If the initial fireball temperature is 20 X 106 K, the average
x-ray energy is about (kT = 1/40 eV at 300 K)

E. v '"'-'3 kT

= (3/40

eV) (20X 106 K/300 K) = 5 keV.

The flux ofx rays at a GPS detector from a 1-kt explosion is

U IE. v . = (l.4X 10 14 )/(2X 104 km)2(0.005 MeV)
= 108 /cm 2

V(shock) ~ V(sound),

•

Since 0.3% of the yield appears in the form of prompt
gamma rays and about 70% of the yield appears as x rays,
the prompt gamma-ray flux is

U

= (0.003/0.7)( 1.4 X 10 14 ) Y IR 2
=6x10 11 YIR

2

delay times of the first minimum and second maximum in
the light intensity to obtain estimates for the yield of a
weapon. Optical "bhangmeters" have been devised to de
tect double pulses above the background of the intense
brightness of the earthshine. Since the hydrodynamical
and radiation transport mechanisms of nuclear explosions
are very complex, one can only roughly estimate these rela
tive delay times. Estimate the time from the explosion to
the minimum light intensity when the shocked region has
expanded beyond the fireball ("breakaway") and blocks
the radiation from the fireball. The radius of the fireball at
"breakaway" is 4 R = 520 y O.4 , where R is in meters and Y
is in Mt. For the case of Y = 20 kt, use an average tempera
ture4 ,6 of 100 000 K during the time regime (ms) of break
away. The shock front velocity is not very different from
the velocity of sound at very high pressures and tempera
tures,
Answer. The average shock velocity for a 20-kt explosion
before "breakaway" is approximately

MeV/cm 2

•

These results are in agreement with the results from the
Los Alamos Vela program. 5

B. Tests in the atmosphere
A nuclear explosion in the atmosphere will give a unique
double-peaked optical signature (Fig. 1). The initial burst
ofx rays lasts less than 1Its; these x rays are absorbed in the
first few meters of air and their energy then "diffuses" to
create a fireball by heating 4 ,6 the air to about 106 K. Shortly
afterwards a shock wave carries the energy beyond the fire
ball. Since this high-temperature shqcked gas is ionized, it
is opaque to the optical radiation from the fireball behind
it, thus reducing the luminosity of the fireball. After the
shocked gas has expanded and cooled, it again becomes
transparent to light, and the intensity of the fireball again
rises. One can use empirical algorithms from the relative

= (331 m/s)(1oo000

K/273 K)1/2

= 6400 m/s.
The approximate time to the minimum emission at break
way is
t~520 y

0

.4

m/(6400 m/s)

= 81 y O.4 ms,

which is in good agreement with the empirical relation giv
en by Brode, 6 t = 60 y0.4 ms. For a 19-kt weapon, t~ ( 110
m)/(6400m/s) = 17ms, which is in good agreement with
the data5 of Fig. 1. Additional confirmation of the explo
sion is obtained from coincidence measurements between
the activation of the bhangmeter and the arrival of the elec
tromagnetic pulse (EMP) which accompanies a nuclear
explosion. Additional evidence will be available from the
new GPS system which will observe any spot on the Earth
with 4-8 (of the 18) GPS satellites at all times, The accu
rate clock system of the GPS satellites will allow triangula
tion methods to determine the position of a nuclear explo
sion with great accuracy. Had these instruments been
functioning in 1979, they would, most likely, have removed
the ambiguity from the Vela data of the "event" over the
South Atlantic. (In 1980, the Presidential Office of Science
and Technology Policy reported that the light signals were
probably not from a nuclear explosion.)

C. Underground tests
Two of the main arguments that have been raised about
the ability to monitor a Complete Test Ban (CTB) are as
w
follows: (1) The nation that desired to cheat might dig a
10'3
large cavity for its nuclear test so that the nuclear explosion
~
would be relatively decoupled from the earth, thus reduc
-.J
«
ing
the amplitude of the seismic signal by as much as a
::2:
a::
factor of 60 to 200. (2) Because earthquakes and nuclear
w 10'2
explosions create fairly similar seismic signals, it is neces
I
I
sary to distinguish nuclear explosions from earthquakes.
-.J
By using seismic magnitudes based both on short-period
~
body
waves (m b ) and on long-period surface waves (Ms )'
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seismologists have distinguished nuclear tests from
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earthquakes as well as estimated yields of underground ex
plosions. In order to maximize the capability to verify a
Fig. 1. Optical double pulse from a bhangmeter. The optical double pulse
CTB, each side must be able to observe seismic signals on
of a 19-kt nuclear weapon exploded in the atmosphere. Figure courtesy of
the soil of the other country. Starting in the mid-1960s, The
Los Alamos National Laboratory.
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Sandia National Laboratory built and tested unattended
seismic stations, 7 and now uses them in a network in the
US, Canada, and Norway. A network of about 40 stations
located inside and adjacent to the USSR could distinguish
earthquakes from nuclear tests with yields as low as about 8
1 kt. The close proximity of the in-country stations would
improve the capability to observe the higher frequencies
(up to 30 Hz or higher). Identification ofthe type ofsource
of the signal is based8 •9 on the fact that explosions have a
greater fraction of their energy content at higher frequen
cies than do earthquakes.
1. Cavity size

Consider a nuclear explosion of yield Yin a cavity in salt
such that the pressure from the explosion at a distance (a)
does not exceed the elastic limit (Po) of the medium. How
large a cavity would be needed to decouple a 1-kt explo
sion? Assume the elastic limit for salt is Po = 440 bar, and
y = cplc v = 1.2 (at high temperatures).
Answer. Since the explosion takes place very rapidly, the
expansion is adiabatic with pv r = C, a constant. The ener
gy Y of the weapon does work on the air in the cavity,

Y=

f

-PdV=

f

2. High frequencies

The frequency spectrum ofan explosion (U) is obtained
by Fourier transforming the elastic displacement produced
by a step pressure at a distance (r) from the explosion in a
uniform medium,9.IO

=

10

1

~
::0.

~

(a 3Pov)[(cr)(v 2 -0.75a 2 +ivaw)] ,

-'
t
1

(1)

-----------------l

\,

',-;

F-:::UENCY

0.01 _ . _ . _ _

_ _ DECOUPLED EXPLOSION

~--""'"'".."

'\~,~_~
,
.
~

--------------

",

------;-,

"\~

0.0001

I

~ TAMPED EXPLOSION

CORNER

0.'· -_. - . ' \

0.001

U(w«v/a)

= Poa 3 / cvr ,

is not a function of w, the' seismic frequency is constant
until it drops (Fig. 2) at the "corner frequency." Since the
energy Y of the weapon is proportional to Poa 3 , U(w ) .is
proportional to Y and does not depend on a as long as
a> ac' This is the basis of Latter's statement IO that the size
of the cavity does not affect the distant signal as long as the
radius ofthe cavity is greater than the decoupling radius ac '
The high-frequency limit of U(w) is proportional to
w- 2 • Since the corner frequency of an explosion is greater
than the corner frequency of an earthquake with the same
spectral level at low frequencies, the signal from an explo
sion is enhanced with respect to earthquakes and micro
seismic noise at the higher frequencies. Thus the spectrum
above about 30 Hz can help distinguish nuclear tests from
earthquakes and seismic noise.
III. OPTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

-CV- r dV=CV 1 -r/(y-1),

Y=PoV/(y-1) =Po(41Ta~/3)/(y-1).
Using the values Y = 1 kt, Y = 1.2, and Po = 440 bar, we
obtain a value for the minimum elastic radius, a c = 16 m,
which agrees with the value calculated9,IO for a deep cavity
several km below the surface. For Y = 1 Mt, a c = 160 m,
and V would be 1000 times larger.

U(w)

where the compressional wave velocity v = 4 km/s and c is
a constant. Comment on the high- and low-frequency lim
its of U(w).
Answer. Since the low-frequency limit of Eq. (1) ,

I
I

A. Film versus CCDs
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The optical systems for reconnaissance have im
proved 11.12 considerably in a variety ofways: (1) Commer
ical aerial survey films are now available with a high con
trast capability of about 1000 line pairs per mm, or about 1
f.l between lines. (2) Chromatic aberration has been re
duced with the aid of computer-aided design and machin
ing of lenses. (3) The blurring of a photograph by the for
ward motion of a satellite has been removed by slightly
moving the film relative to the lens with precise timing
mechanisms and servo-control systems. (4) Similar ob
jects may reflect and emit differently in the visible and in
frared wavelength regions. These differences can be stud
ied with multispectral cameras using multiple lens systems
which take multiple (at least nine) photographs at differ
ent wavelengths of the same object. (5) By using two views
of the same terrain taken at different angles, one c:an obtain
stereoscopic images which resolve the heights of objects.
Such a cartographic camera in the space shuttle can cover
an area of25 000 km 2 in stero with a resolution ofabout 10
m by using only a single pair of pictures. (6) Fourier trans
form infrared spectroscopy can rapidly and accurately de
termine trace impurities in the air. In this paper we will
discuss progress in four additional reconnaissance areas,
namely for charge-coupled devices (CCD), adaptive op
tics, digital image processing, and infrared.
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Fig. 2. High-frequency seismic detection. Relative seismic amplitudes as a
function offrequency ofearthquakes, and nuclear weapons explosions (I
kt decoupled, and tamped). The detection of the seismic signals from
explosions are enhanced with respect to earthquakes at higher frequen
cies. Figure courtesy of J. Evernden.

Compare the approximate resolutions available with a
CCD 13 with a pixel size of 10 f.l and films of 100 and 1000
lines/mm. Assume a camera focal length (j) of 6, a lens
diameter (D) of 1 m, and a camera altitude of 120 km.
Some have said that it is possible to read the masthead of
the newspaper Pravda from a satellite; is this possible?
Answer. Since the object distance (0 = 120 km) is much
greater than the focal length ( f = 6 m), the image distance
is i = f = 6 m. The resolution of the image is about 10 f.l
(hi) for the film of 100 lines/mm (1 line/1O- 5 m). This
corresponds to an object resolution of
h o = hi (o/i)

=

(10- 5 m) (12 X 104 m/6 m)

= 20

cm.

The angular spread from diffraction effects since the dif
fraction limit for a 1-m lens is about
0d

= 1.UID= (1.2)(5XIO- 7

m)/(1 m) =0.6 ,urad.

The value of 1.U I D is a reasonable compromise between
the full width between the diffraction minima (2.4 AID)
and the full width at half-maximum intensity (0.8 AID).
The diffraction broadening can be neglected here because
0d' the diffraction limit, is much less than the angular un
certainty from the 1O-,u film,
.
Of

= H;li = 10- 5 /6 =

1.7 ,urad.

The 1000-lines/mm film (hi = 1,u) would introduce an
angular spread of0.17 J.lrad, but this film and camera com
bination does not give the theoretical resolution of ho = 2
cm because the diffraction spread of d = 0.6,urad exceeds
the film spread of Of = 0.17 ,urad. (Real systems may
achieve resolutions about midway between these two ex
treme cases, or, perhaps, about 10 cm.) To improve the
resolution to the limit caused by atmospheric turbulence
(Sec. III B), it is desirable to go to larger lenses, as for
example the 2.4-m mirror of the space telescope.
CCDs are in many ways mucll more attractive than film
for photo-reconnaissance because they can be used in real
time with computers, they can be reused (the amount of
available film often detemiinesthe useable life of a photo
graphic satellite), they are sensitive to a broader range of
frequencies, they have a much greater dynamic range
between black and white, their response is extremely linear
compared to the nonlinearity offilm, and they are about 70
times more efficient in using light than film. CCDs will be
used in the space telescope ( 1600 X 1600 pixels, about 10,u
in size) to obtain resolutions ofabout 0.3 to 0.5 ,urad. How
ever, .the larger pixel size of CCDs is exacerbated by an
additional factor of !ibout 2 since it takes about 2 to 2.5
pixels to obtain the same ground information as one line
pair from film. Thus it willbe necessary to use CCDs with
longer focal length (or folded optics) cameras. [Since the
better resolutions (2 cm) from the better films ( 1000 linesl
mm) are unobtainable because of diffraction limitations,
the CCDs would not have to compete with that situation by
having a focal lengths of (10 for pixel) (2 for CCD) = 20
times longer.] Ultimately, the criteria for the use of CCDs
rests on (l) what resolution is necessary to do the job and
(2) data handling ability. If the resolution of a reconnais
sance satellite was 10 cm, it should not be possible to read
the Pravda masthead, but it should be possible to distin
guish a VW Beetle from a Chevrolet Vega. It should be
possible to obtain sufficient of resolutions with CCDs by
increasing the focal length of 6 m by a factor of about 5.
Because of their many advantages, CCDs are becoming
very important for verification even if long focal length
systems have to be built, or if some resolution has to be
sacrificed. By taking occasional CCD pictures of large
areas and subtracting them in the computer from previous
pictures taken in the same season, changes in the scenery
can be observed.

°

B. Looldng downward versus upward

Stars twinkle at night because of the variations in refrac
tion in the air cells caused by turbulence in the atmosphere.
The problem of looking downward from a satellite is con
siderably smaller than looking upward (the "seeing")
from a telescope, which is about 5 ,urad (1 arcsec). The

"seeing" looking downward should be less since the satel
lites are more than 10 times further from the turbulence.
How might the asymetries of this phenomena be illuminat
ed using ( 1) the simple lens formula, (2) an optical bench,
and (3) a shower curtain.
Answer. (1) Using a ~-m converging lens, establish an
image of an object with some fine detail, such as a wire
mesh, that is about 5 m from the lens. Place a bunsen
burner first near the object, and then near the lens. Note
that the turbulence from the burner does not noticably dis
tort the image when it is close to the object, but that it does
distort the image when it is placed near the lens. (2) Apply
the thin lens equation to a two-lens system in which the first
lens has a long focal length, implying turbulence in the
Earth's atmosphere, and the second lens is the camera lens.
By slightly shifting the location (or its focal length ) of the
first lens, the position of the final image is slightly shifted.
For the reconnaissance case, when the first lens (the atmo
sphere) is close to the object (the missile silo) and far from
the second lens (the reconnaissance camera), the effect of
shifting the lens is very small (second order I4 ). For the
astronomical case, when the first lens (the atmosphere) is
close to the second lens (the telescope) and far from the
object (the stars), the correction for the final image loca
tion is larger (first order). (3) The next time you are taking
a shower with a translucent shower curtain, observe that
you are unable to see objects clearly through the curtain,
but if you look over the curtain into a distant mirror, you
will be able to see quite clearly your hand near the curtain.
C. Adaptive optics

For the case oflarge diameter cameras, atmospheric tur
bulence is not as significant a problem for reconnaissance
satellites as it is for taking pictures from the earth of astro
nomical objects and satellites in orbit. The technique l5 of
adaptive optics (AO) has been used to improve the resolu
tion of Earth-based telescopes to nearly the diffraction lim
it. Adaptive optics uses wave front sensors and wave front
processors to determine distortions (the slope) in the wave
front ofthe incoming light; this information is used to de
form a mirror to correct for the misalignment of the wave
front. (1) If the turbulent air cells in the troposphere at an
altitute of 10 km have a size of about 10 to 20 cm, would
adaptive optics be useful for observing objects in orbit from
the Earth? (2) What is the limit to the angular resolution
for cameras on the earth and in orbit caused by turbulence?
(3) How deformable should the AO mirror be? (4) How
good must the tracking for AO be to observe objects in
orbit from the Earth?
Answer. (1) Turbulence in the tropopause (10 km)
causes angular blurring at the Earth-based telescope of
about
Or = 0.1 milO km = 5 - 10 ,urad.
This is considerably larger than the diffraction limit of 0.6
,urad for a 1-m mirror (Sec. III A), hence AO can be useful
for monitoring objects in orbit. (2) Since reconnaissance
satellites are more than ten times further away from the
troposphere,Ot is about 0.5-1 ,urad; therefore, AO is pres
ently of marginal use for reconnaissance satellites. Only for
mirrors larger than about 1 m and for the best films would
AO become attractive enough to warrant the effort for pho
tography in low-Earth orbit. (3) Since the. wavelength of
visible light is about 0.5,u, a deformable mIrror must pro

vide about I fl of compensation with a precision ofabout 10
nm (I % ). (4) The computer systems must be able to re"
spond within about 1 ms since the period of the atmospher
ic disturbances is about 20 ms. Since a satellite moves at
about 8000 mis, it would move during that time (1 ms)
(8000 m/s) = 8 m. It wouldbe necessary to have extreme
ly accurate tracking of about 1% (8 cm/ms) of this value
for the AO telescopes to retain a resolution of 10 cm.

SIN

G(k)

D. Digital image processing
The advent of electro-opticai devices such as CCDs and
very large scale integrated circuits (VLSIC) enhances the
ability to monitor military activities. Digital image pro
cessing (DIP) techniques l6 can restore and enhance pho
tographs that have been blurred by a variety ofcauses. DIP
can be used to subtract one picture from another picture
taken at a later time to extract changes in the scenery dur
ing the elapsed time. It can enhance edges and lines in an
image, remove noise from the picture, enhance contrasts
such as partially removing clouds, and search for various
patterns such as circular missile silos or movable SS-20
missiles launchers. These techniques have been applied to a
, wide variety of fields such as photography, radar, sonar,
and medicine. The formation of an image (g) involves ari
image spreading function
g(x,Y)

=

J:ooJ:oo

+ n(x,y) ,

1. The convolution theorem

Ifwe ignore the noise term in Eq. (2), its Fourier trans
form to the frequency domain is
G(u, v) = H(u, v) S(u, v) ,

(3)

where G, H, and S are the two-dimensional Fourier trans
forms ofthe image (g), the point-spread function (he)' and
the signal (s) at the detector. The beauty ofthe convolution
theorem is that the equation in the frequency domain is less
complex since it is multiplicative without the integration
operations. As a simple application, consider a one-dimen
sional photograph of very narrow spots of light from two
lasers which can be represented by delta functions. (1) If
one observes an image
x

2
/2cr

+ Be -

(X_D)2 12cr ) ,

(4)

where are the lasers, what are their intensities, and what is
he? (2) How could he be determined for an optical system
in orbit as it takes pictures of objects on the ground?
Answer. If we assume a Gaussian point-spread function
he =Ne-(X~XI)2/2cr

I~~
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SeX)
Fig. 3. Fourier transform. (a): A one-dimensional silo 20 pixels wide is
placed in a field ioo pixels wide. The photographic data, g(x), indicates
that the silo is severely hidden by the large signal to noise ratio (SIN = I).
(b): The spatial data is Fourier transformed to obtain its frequency spec
trum: F [g(x) I = G(k). (c): The noise is removed from the photo by
Fourier transforming only the lowest four frequency components back to
position space to make the "silo" more apparent: F [G(k) I = s(x) for n
only from 1-4.

with N = (21Tcr) -1/2, one obtains
(2)

where he is the composite point-spread function (caused by
object or image motion, distortions by the detector, and
aberrations by the optical system), s is the direct and indi
rect flux at the sensor, and n is the noise. The information
that we would like to extract from the image to obtain the
puresignal is compounded because the point-spread func
tion is multiplicative and the noise is additive. It is possible
to improve the extraction process by analyzing the image in
the frequency domain through Fourier transforms.

= N(Ae -

1

he(x-xl'Y-YI)

Xs(xItYI)dx j dYI

g(x)

=

I

(b)

g(x) =N J:~ e-(X-XI)2

12cr

[A8(0) +B8(D)]dx l ·

Since this integral gives Eq. (4), our choice for he was
correct. The intensities of the lasers are A and B, and they
are located at 0 and D. (2) For the case of a real satellite
system, the function he can be obtained by pointing a laser
from the Earth to the satellite. The data (g) and the known
signal (s) are Fourier transformed to give the Fourier
transformofh e [Eq. (3),H = GIS]. Fourier transforming
H to real space gives he; this function includes not only the
point-spread function of the system, but also the turbu
lence effects which vary with time.
2. The addition theorem

A picture of a silo can be partially hidden by a lack of
contrast and photographic noise. In the case when the opti
cal resolution is small compared to the size of the silo, one
can ignore the point-spread function (he); Eq. (2) be
comes
g(x)

= sex) + n(x)

in one dimension. Since the diameter of the silo is much
larger than the average wavelength of the noise, it will be
possible to remove much of the noise in the frequency do
main. The Fourier transform addition theorem is
F [g(x)) = G(k) = F [sex)

= S(k) + N(k)

,

+ n(x)]
(5)

whereFis the Fourier transform. How can one remove the
noise from a one-dimensional picture,
g(x) =NNRnd(1) +s,
where NN is the peak noise, Rnd (I) is a random number

from 0 to 1, and the silo (s) is placed in only part of the
domain?
Answer. See Fig. 3 for the case of a silo 20 pixels wide
located in a field 100 pixels wide with an average signal to
noise ratio of SIN = 1.
IV. INFRARED RECONNAISSANCE
Infrared technologies have developed 17 to the point
where scanning devices routinely detect temperature dif
ferences of about 0.1 K. Infrared pictures from satellites
can be useful for a variety of verification tasks: counting
"warm" missile silos to determine compliance with SALT,
determing activity at nuclear production reactors and at
enrichment and reprocessing facilities to monitor a freeze
on the production of fissile isotopes (Pu, U-235), to ob
serve tests of space weapons (ASAT and BMD), and so
forth. The infrared reconnaissance satellites detect a differ
ent kind of data (heat), but they are not as capable as those
operating in the visible region at this time. The ir satellites
use smaller arrays of up to 20 000 detectors as compared to
optical CCDs with arrays of 3 million detectors.
A. Resolution
There are two windows in the atmosphere which trans
mit ir, between 3 and 5 fL and between 8 and 14 fL. For space
based photography the 8 to 14-fL window is often preferable
because most of the Earth is at 300 K (10 fL), and the 8 to
14-fL window is further removed from reflected sunlight at
0.5 fL. (1) What is the maximum resolution in the 8 to 14~fL
region from a satellite at an altitude (0) of 120 km, using a
mirror diameter (D) of 1 m and folded, long-focal-length
optics? (2) How would one have to modify Si to detect ir
radition?
Answer. ( 1) Since the longer wavelengths for ir radiation
increase the diffraction limit of the angular resolution, we
will neglect the geometrical spreading from the size of the
detector. For case of 14-fL ir radiation with a 1-m mirror,
we obtain
0d = I.UID= (1.2)(14XlO- 6 m)/(1 m) = 20fLrad ,
which gives a mimimum spatial resolution of
ho =

Oed

= (120 km) (20 fLrad) = 2 - 3 m.

This result is consistent with the resolutions obtained in
recent astronomical ir measurements: The IRAS satellite
observed a ring ofsolid material at an angle of 50fLrad from
the star Vegas, Mt. Polomar has obtained 4 fLrad in the ir,
and the 4-m Kitt Peak telescope observed a "planet" 5fLrad
from the star VB-8. Infrared photography does notresolve
objects as well as photography using visible light, but it is
sufficient to detect silos and vehicles. (2) When an impuri
ty such as Ga is incorporated into Si, it has energy levels at
about 0.1 eV above the valence band which can be excited
by the lO-fL radiation since E = 1.24. Semiconducting
compounds with narrow bandgaps also are used to detect ir
light.
B. ir temperature sensitivity
What accuracy is required to measure temperatures of
objects near room temperature differences to within
!:J.T=O.OI K?
Answer. Since the maximum of the blackbody curve (10
fL for 300 K) is approximately in the center ofthe 8- to 14-fL

window, the integral response of the detector is approxi
mately proportional to T 4 for small changes in temperature
(!:J.T). (This can be shown with numerical integrations of
the Planck distribution function.) The difference in accu
mulated charge or voltage is approximately proportional to
!:J.(aT 4 ) = (aT 4 )(4!:J.TIT)

when !:J.T«T. For !:J.T= 0.01 K and T= 300 K, the re
quired accuracy is about (4) (Om K)/300 K = 0.01 %,
i.e., the charge accumulated in the ir detector would have
to be measured with an accuracy of one part in 10 000. The
ir radiation emitted by the atmosphere gives a background
radiation noise which tends to degrade the accuracy of the
temperature measurement from a satellite.
C. Detection of cool objects at a distance
The quantum efficiency of a Si:Ga detector in the ir re
gion is about 0.5. Determine if an ir detector can detect a
cool (273 K) object with a total area of 1 m 2 (a satellite or a
reentry vehicle) at a distance of 1000 km. (1) What rate of
charge collection could be obtained by a detector that uses
a I-m diameter mirror to enhance its effective area? About
35% of the blackbody radiation from an ice cube (273 K)
falls within the 8- to 14-fL window. Since the object is in
space, the background radiation can be ignored. (2) What
signal to noise (SIN) ratio (from the thermal noise in the
detector) might be expected if the detectivity (D) is about
5 X 10 12 where D = (S/N)IP, where P is the ir power on
the detector from the cool object in the 8- to 14-fL window.
This value ofD was multiplied by a factor of 100 to account
for detector size, amplifier bandwidth, and field of view.
Answer. (I) The object radiates (between 8 and 14 fL, in
mks units)
Pir = (0.35)(aT 4A)

= (0.35)(5.7X10- s )(273 4 )(1) = 110 W.
At a distance of 1000 km (R) the I-m-diam (D) mirror
collects
P= (Pir )(D 2 /16R

2

)

=7XlO- 12 W.

This corresponds to a photon (average photons of 11 fL,
0.11 eV) flux at the detector of 4 X lOs per second. Since
the quantum efficiency is 0.5, about 2X lOs electrons/s
could be collected by the detector. The signal to noise ratio
would be about
SIN = DP= (5X 10 12 )(7 X 10- 12 ) = 35.

Since both the SIN ratio and the charge collection rate are
large, the detection time can be quite short.
V.RADAR
A. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
SAR systems lS mounted in satellites are presently used
to obtain maps of features on the Earth and the planets as
well as to monitor military activities. Because the wave
length ofradar waves is longer than optical waves, the reso
lution from SAR is not as good as that obtained with opti
cal systems. However, radar has the greatattribute that it
can be used during the night and when the Earth is covered
with clouds, rain, or foliage. To obtain high resolution ra
dar images of the Earth from a satellite would require an
antenna several miles long. To circumvent this problem,
the motion of the satellite or aircraft carrying the SAR

system is used to increase the effective size of the antenna.
A resolution of about 25 m has been obtained with the
SEASAT satellite at an orbit height of 800 lan. Consider
ably better resolutions of 1-3 m are possible at a higher
radar frequency of 10 GHz, and at lower altitudes. For
example, consider the case of a radar operating at 6 GHz
(A = 0.05 m) at a slant range of R = 200 km. (1) What is
the effective size ofa SAR antenna needed to obtain a reso
lution (AR) of 5 m? (2) What is the processing time to
obtain this resolution?
Answer. (1) the angular resolution is approximately
(2)

()d

= aR /R = 25

f-lrad

The deceleration gives the ratio of the weight to the drag
force (0 = FD/m) to obtain{3. The value of{3 for an accu
rate RV of 800 Ib with an area of 3 ft and a drag coefficient
CD of 0.15 is about
{3 = W /CDA

=

(800 1b)/(0.15) (3 fe)

=

1800 Ib/fe.
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= A /2D.

(The synthesized antenna produces an effective beam
width from an antenna which is twice the synthetic an
tenna length.) This give a synthetic aperture of D = 1000
m. (2) Since the orbital velocity is about 8 km/s, the pro
cessing time for the SAR system must be about (1 km/8
km/s) = 0.1 s. Longer processing times would improve re
solution in the tracking direction parallel to the velocity of
the satellite, but it can never be better than! of the width of
the actual physical antenna. As in the case of optical sys
tems, the best achievable resolutions would be limited by
atmospheric inhomogeneities and radar stability. Three
dimensional surface maps can be obtained by either placing
two antennas on a satellite or airplane, or by comparing
data from two successive passes over the region of interest.
B. Missile coefficient

In order to monitor "new types" of missiles under
SALT, it is necessary to be able to determine some quanti
tative aspects of individual reentry vehicles (RV) from
ICBMs. The accuracy ofan RV will be increased ifthe drag
forces are small compared to its weight since the drag force
disturbs the trajectory in unpredictable ways. The ratio of
an RV's weight (W) to its effective area (CDA, where CD is
the drag coefficient) is called its missile coefficient,
{3 = W /CDA, usually given in English units. How can ra
dar be used to measure (3, and thus monitor the accuracy of
anRV?
Answer. By measuring the Doppler shift (6.j) of the
reflected radar signal, the velocity can be determined from

a/= 2v//e,
where / is the radar frequency and v is the velocity of the
RV. By measuring the change of a/with time, one can
determine the deceleration of the RV in the atmosphere.
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